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ALEXANDER K. OBRECHT*

Migrating Towards an Incidental
Take Permit Program: Overhauling
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act to
Comport with Modern Industrial
Operations
ABSTRACT
In 1918, Congress passed the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) to
curb mass avian extermination caused by hunting and poaching. Despite Congress’s initial concern with these activities, the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service (FWS) expanded the scope of MBTA enforcement to include bird deaths caused by industrial activities. This created a glaring split of authority among U.S. Circuit Courts of
Appeals, with one side applying strict liability under the MBTA for
all deaths of protected birds caused by industrial activities and the
other side refusing to apply the MBTA to indirect and unintentional
bird deaths.
This article argues that the best solution would be for Congress or the FWS to establish an incidental take permit program that
would exempt industrial operators from prosecution for certain indirect, unintentional bird deaths caused by industrial activities. Such a
program would provide the best balance between the MBTA’s conservation principles and the reality of vital and growing industrial
operations. A permit program would provide industrial operators
with certainty concerning liability and project planning, and provide
the FWS with a tool to fund and ensure conservation of migratory
birds, while still allowing the FWS to prosecute those failing to obtain a permit or violating the Act in another way.

INTRODUCTION
“[N]o living man will see again the onrushing phalanx of victorious
birds, sweeping a path for spring across the March skies . . . .”
—Aldo Leopold1

* J.D., University of Wyoming College of Law, 2013. The author would like to thank
Professor Sam Kalen for his help and guidance during the last two years, and Rachel
Ryckman for her patience.
1. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC: WITH OTHER ESSAYS ON CONSERVATION
FROM ROUND RIVER 116 (1966).
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Aldo Leopold’s vivid depiction of the disappearance of many of
America’s original wild birds highlights the tragic success of hunters and
poachers in annihilating many abundant species at the turn of the twentieth century.2 Public outcry led to several early, unsuccessful attempts to
restrict commercial hunting of birds.3 In 1918, Congress passed the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), which generally forbids the harassment, killing, and selling of protected birds and their eggs and nests—
often generically termed “take.”4
Initially, courts faced little difficulty applying the MBTA to bird
deaths caused by traditional hunting and poaching activities. However,
the statutory scheme contains no explicit limitation on the type of conduct that is proscribed by the MBTA.5 In the 1970s, the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS) began to prosecute activities that were outside the
MBTA’s original scope.6 The FWS now applies the MBTA to industrial
activities for bird deaths caused by wastewater ponds, oil and gas extraction, electricity transmission, logging, pesticide application, communication tower construction, and even wind farms.7 This expanded

2. See infra notes 14–35 and accompanying text (outlining the destruction of migratory birds caused by hunting and poaching at the turn of the twentieth century).
3. See infra notes 30–42 and accompanying text (describing Congress’s early attempts
to regulate wildlife).
4. 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2012). The entire statutory trigger reads:
[I]t shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner, to
pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill, possess,
offer for sale, sell, offer to barter, barter, offer to purchase, purchase, deliver for shipment, ship, export, import, cause to be shipped, exported, or
imported, deliver for transportation, transport or cause to be transported,
carry or cause to be carried, or receive for shipment, transportation, carriage, or export, any migratory bird, any part, nest, or egg of any such
bird, or any product, whether or not manufactured, which consists, or is
composed in whole or part, of any such bird or any part, nest, or egg
thereof . . . ;
Id.; see also 16 U.S.C. § 705 (containing further prohibitions on the transportation and importation of protected birds).
5. See infra notes 85–87 and accompanying text (discussing the original aim of the
MBTA and how the language actually turned out).
6. See infra notes 99–109 and accompanying text (describing the difficulty courts have
had in interpreting the MBTA’s scope in regard to incidental take caused by industrial
activities).
7. See infra notes 101–105 and accompanying text (listing industrial activities that the
FWS has prosecuted). On November 22, 2013, just as this article headed to publication,
Duke Energy Renewables, Inc. pleaded guilty to the first ever MBTA prosecution of a wind
farm. Press Release, The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Dist. of Wyo., Utility Company Sentenced in Wyoming for Killing Protected Birds at Wind Projects (Nov. 22, 2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/wy/news/2013/11november/13-081_nov22.html. From
2009 to 2013, authorities discovered 163 dead protected birds at two of Duke’s wind farms
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prosecution of industrial incidental take created a glaring split of authority among U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, with one side applying strict
liability to unintentional bird deaths resulting from industrial activities,
limited only by proximate cause,8 and the other refusing to apply the
MBTA to indirect and unintentional deaths that are outside the MBTA’s
original scope of prohibited conduct—hunting and poaching.9 The resulting circuit split has led to confusion for the FWS, industry, and lower
courts.10
Congress should end the confusion by amending the MBTA to
authorize an incidental take program, which would allow limited unintentional killings of protected birds upon approval of the FWS. This
would provide the clarity that the FWS, industry, and courts require,
provide industry with certainty concerning liability and project planning, and provide the best balance between the MBTA’s conservation
principles and the reality that certain industrial operations inevitably kill
protected birds. It would enable the FWS to ensure conservation of migratory birds, while still allowing the FWS to prosecute companies that
fail to obtain a permit or violate the Act in some other way.
This article proceeds in three sections. Part I provides the historical backdrop of the MBTA, details the underlying treaties, and illustrates
the functional operation of the Act. Part II reviews the varying judicial
interpretations of the Act.11 In Part III, the article considers options to
solve the current MBTA confusion, including (1) congressional redefinition of MBTA take, (2) congressional authorization of an incidental take
permit program, and (3) FWS implementation of an incidental take permit program without explicit congressional authorization.12 The article
concludes that a congressionally-authorized incidental take permit program would best solve the current confusion surrounding the application and scope of the MBTA.13

in Wyoming. Id. As a result, the company agreed to pay $1 million in fines and develop an
environmental compliance plan to prevent bird deaths at its other wind farms. Id.
8. See infra notes 149–182 and accompanying text (outlining the strict liability approach to the MBTA).
9. See infra notes 127–148 and accompanying text (highlighting the narrow interpretation of MBTA take).
10. See infra notes 203–205 and accompanying text (emphasizing the confusion created
by the circuit split and the expansion of the MBTA).
11. See infra PART II: JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MBTA.
12. See infra PART III: AUTHORIZING INCIDENTAL TAKE.
13. See infra CONCLUSION.
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I. THE MBTA: HISTORY, TREATIES, AND OPERATION
A. Historical Backdrop
The MBTA arose in a time of booming commercial trade in and
recreational hunting of animals.14 The 1800s ushered in an expanding
frontier economy accompanied by sprawling population growth creeping through the American West.15 It was the overhunting (and the near
extinction) of bison that alerted many in the U.S. to the vulnerability of
those species that were subject to commercial hunting.16 However,
overhunting extended far beyond bison to all species of ungulates, large
predators, beaver, fish, sea cows,17 and migratory birds.18
Frontier hunters harvested birds to provide for lavish clothing
decoration and exotic table-fare in metropolitan restaurants.19 Hunting
for culinary purposes destroyed the Labrador Duck population, causing
it to disappear from New England meat markets after 1875.20 However,
the killing extended well beyond hunting for food.21 The expansion of
commercial hunting operations for recreation, feathers, and other bird

14. Meredith Blaydes Lilley & Jeremy Firestone, Wind Power, Wildlife, and the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act: A Way Forward, 38 ENVTL. L. 1167, 1176–77 (2008) (“During the 1800s, unchecked overharvesting of migratory birds in North America brought some to extinction
and others to the edge of it.”).
15. See BRIAN CZECH & PAUL R. KRAUSMAN, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: HISTORY,
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 8 (2001) (discussing the development of the
frontier economy based first and foremost around bison).
16. Id. (At the turn of the twentieth century, one estimate reported only 25 free ranging
bison remained.).
17. Id. at 9–10 (“Steller’s sea cow, the only member of its genus and the largest of all
sirenians, was slaughtered into extinction from 1741 to 1768 by Vitus Bering’s stranded
crew and subsequent visitors to Bering Island.”).
18. See id. at 10 (outlining America’s increasing awareness of losing species, especially
birds).
19. A Guide to the Laws and Treaties of the United States for Protecting Migratory Birds,
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., http://www.fws.gov/migratorybirds/RegulationsPolicies/
treatlaw.html (Apr. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Protecting Migratory Birds] (“By the late 1800s, the
hunting and shipment of birds for the commercial market (to embellish the platters of elegant restaurants) and the plume trade (to provide feathers to adorn lady’s fancy hats) had
taken their toll on many bird species.”).
20. CZECH & KRAUSMAN, supra note 15, at 10; EDWARD HOWE FORBUSH ET AL., A HISTORY OF THE GAME BIRDS, WILD-FOWL AND SHORE BIRDS OF MASSACHUSETTS AND ADJACENT
STATES 416 (Wright and Potter 1912) (“The last Labrador Duck of which we have record
died by the hand of man near Long Island, New York, in 1875 . . . .”).
21. Lilley & Firestone, supra note 14, at 1178 (“The game business also drove other
species, such as the heath hen, golden plover, and Eskimo curlew, to the brink of extinction
by 1890.”).
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products, along with improvements in firearms, led to an increase in the
number of hunters and the size of the harvests.22
The dramatic impact commercial hunting had on bird populations
is best illustrated by the demise of the passenger pigeon.23 By ornithologists’ estimates, the passenger pigeon once represented the most abundant species of bird on Earth.24 In the late 1700s to early 1800s, the father
of American ornithology, Alexander Wilson, estimated the size of one
flock of passenger pigeons to be 240 miles long and a mile wide.25 By
Wilson’s calculations, the flock “contain[ed] two billion, two hundred
and thirty million, two hundred and seventy-two thousand pigeons.”26
Other bird observers echoed Wilson’s astonishment at the staggering
amount of passenger pigeons in America’s skies: “They say that when a
flock of passenger pigeons flew across the countryside, the sky grew
dark. The air rumbled and turned cold. Bird dung fell like hail. Horses
stopped and trembled in their tracks, and chickens went in to roost.”27
But despite the passenger pigeon’s original abundance, the intensity of
commercial hunting drove the species to extinction in the span of less
than three decades.28 The last known passenger pigeon, named Martha,
died on September 1, 1914 in the Cincinnati Zoo. 29
Public outrage against commercial hunting began to reach to Congress.30 The first earnest attempt to stop the wholesale slaughter
culminated in the Lacey Act of 1900.31 The Lacey Act sought to prevent
interstate and international transportation of illegally killed or captured
birds, curb the decline of domestic birds, and prevent the introduction of

22. JENNIFER PRICE, FLIGHT MAPS: ADVENTURES WITH NATURE IN MODERN AMERICA 4
(Basic Books 1999); Lilley & Firestone, supra note 14, at 1178.
23. PRICE, supra note 22, at 5 (“[T]he extinction [of the passenger pigeon] finally persuaded many Americans that the continent’s wildlife was finite and that much of it had
been destroyed.”).
24. FORBUSH, supra note 20, at 433 (“Once the most abundant species, in flights and on
its nesting grounds, ever known in any country, ranging over the greater part of the continent of North America in innumerable hordes, the race seems to have disappeared within
the past thirty year, leaving no trace.”).
25. Id. at 444.
26. Id.
27. PRICE, supra note 22, at 1–2.
28. FORBUSH, supra note 20, at 460 (detailing the drastic decline in passenger pigeon
shipments to metropolitan markets during the 1880s and early 1890s); PRICE, supra note 22,
at 3–5.
29. PRICE, supra note 22, at 3.
30. Lilley & Firestone, supra note 14, at 1178.
31. Lacey Act, Ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187 (1900) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 3371–3378 (2013)); see Lilley & Firestone, supra note 14, at 1178.

R
R

R

R
R
R
R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMN\54-1\NMN104.txt

112

unknown

Seq: 6

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

25-APR-14

8:48

[Vol. 54

harmful foreign bird species.32 Initially, the Act proved ineffective in
stopping the illegal trade in birds33 due to a highly profitable black market and a lack of enforcement officers.34
The Lacey Act’s inadequacies led to another congressional attempt to stop the unchecked hunting and trafficking in wildlife.35 In
1913, Congress passed the Weeks-McLean Law.36 It sought to bring any
birds that ever migrated across state lines under federal regulation,37 despite the traditional authority of the state over the regulation of wildlife.
Hunters prosecuted under the Weeks-McLean Law challenged its constitutionality.38 In general, the defendants argued that the regulation of
wildlife fell solely to the states under the Tenth Amendment, absent the
express constitutional authorization for Congress to regulate it.39 Both of
the U.S. district courts that heard the challenges based their analyses
upon U.S. Supreme Court precedent that states possessed the sole power
to regulate wildlife within their borders.40 Accordingly, both courts held

32. Lacey Act, Ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187 (1900) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 3371–3378 (2013)); Robert S. Anderson, The Lacey Act: America’s Premier Weapon in the
Fight Against Unlawful Wildlife Trafficking, 16 PUB. LAND. L. REV. 27, 29 (1995); see also Lilley
& Firestone, supra note 14, at 1178.
33. Anderson, supra note 32, at 41; Lilley & Firestone, supra note 14, at 1178; Protecting
Migratory Birds, supra note 19.
34. Lilley & Firestone, supra note 14, at 1178; Protecting Migratory Birds, supra note 19.
35. Lilley & Firestone, supra note 14, at 1179; Protecting Migratory Birds, supra note 19.
36. Act of March 4, 1913, ch. 145, 37 Stat. 828, 847 (repealed 1918). The Weeks-McLean
Law boldly attempted to bring all migratory birds, migrating across state lines, under the
control of the federal government. Id.
37. Id. The act provided:
All wild geese, wild swans, brant, wild ducks, snipe, plover, woodcock,
rail, wild pigeons, and all other migratory game and insectivorous birds
which in their northern and southern migrations pass through or do not
remain permanently the entire year within the borders of any State or Territory, shall hereafter be deemed to be within the custody and protection
of the Government of the United States, and shall not be destroyed or
taken contrary to regulations hereinafter provided therefor.
Id. Interestingly for such a novel expansion of federal regulation of wildlife, Congress
passed the act through a rider to an appropriation bill for the Department of Agriculture.
Protecting Migratory Birds, supra note 19.
38. See, e.g., Unites States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288, 290 (D. Kan. 1915); United States v.
Shauver, 214 F. 154, 156 (E.D. Ark. 1914).
39. Lilley & Firestone, supra note 14, at 1179.
40. McCullagh, 221 F. at 293 (“The power of a state to control and regulate the taking of
game cannot be questioned.”) (citing Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896)), overruled by
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979)); Shauver, 214 F. at 158 (citing Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979)).
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the Weeks-McLean Law unconstitutional, as the Constitution granted no
authority to Congress to regulate wildlife.41
B. The Treaties Underlying the MBTA
Unable to protect migratory birds through its interstate commerce
powers, Congress next turned to its treaty powers42 and succeeded in
wresting some of the power to regulate wildlife away from the states.43
In 1916, the United States entered into the first such treaty with Great
Britain.44 To implement that treaty, Congress enacted the MBTA 45 in
1918. Over the years, the United States passed three more migratory bird
treaties with Mexico in 1937, Japan in 1972, the former Soviet Union in
1976,46 and the MBTA was amended accordingly.47 Each treaty expresses

41. McCullagh, 221 F. at 294 (“Unless a departure, as radical in theory as it is important
in its effects, is to be made from fundamental principles long established by our laws, and
long acquiesced in by our people, the act in question must be held incapable of support by
any provision of the organic law of our county.”); Shauver, 214 F. at 160 (“The court is
unable to find any provision in the Constitution authorizing Congress, either expressly or
by necessary implication, to protect or regulate the shooting of migratory wild game when
in a state, and is therefore forced to the conclusion that the act is unconstitutional.”).
42. Larry Martin Corcoran & Elinor Colbourn, Shocked, Crushed and Poisoned: Criminal
Enforcement in Non-Hunting Cases Under the Migratory Bird Treaties, 77 DEN. U. L. REV. 359,
360–61 (1999) (“Secretary of State Robert Lansing and Senator Elihu Root conceived a constitutional solution to the need for federal proection of migratory birds by invoking the
treaty power . . . .”); Protecting Migratory Birds, supra note 19 (“Following close on the heels
of the Lacey Act and the Weeks-McLean Law, the framers of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
were determined to put an end to the commercial trade in birds and their feathers that, by
the early years of the 20th century, had wreaked havoc on the populations of many native
bird species.”); see U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2 (Treaty Clause enabling president to negotiate treaties).
43. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) (“[W]e cannot put the case of the
State upon higher ground than that the treaty deals with creatures that for the moment are
within the state borders, that it must be carried out by officers of the United States within
the same territory, and that but for the treaty the State would be free to regulate this subject itself.”
(emphasis added)).
44. Convention Between the United States and Great Britain for the Protection of Migratory Birds, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702 [hereinafter Canada Treaty]. The
original treaty was enacted with Great Britain as Canada was a British Colony at the time.
See generally 1931–1982: Toward Renewal and Patriation, Constitutional History, CANADA IN
THE MAKING, http://www.canadiana.ca/citm/themes/constitution/constitution15_e.html
(last visited Apr. 26, 2013) (outlining the history of Canada after its severance from the
British Empire in 1931).
45. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, Pub. L. No. 65-186, 40 Stat. 755 (1918) [hereinafter
MBTA] (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2012)).
46. See 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (listing international conventions which the MBTA seeks to
implement).
47. Id.
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slightly different purposes and restraints on its implementation.48 Specifically, the treaties differ as to what extent and how the signatories may
potentially allow for take of migratory birds. 49 Despite the variances between the treaties, their ultimate message rang clear in the MBTA: “[I]t
shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner, to pursue,
hunt, take, capture, [or] kill” any migratory bird, unless permitted by the
FWS.50
1. The Canada Treaty
The first treaty went into effect in 1916 between the United States
and Great Britain.51 The parties sought to save birds migrating between
Canada and the United States from “indiscriminate slaughter” and to
preserve birds “useful to man.”52 Without adequate protection, the parties feared imminent extinction of useful bird species.53
In 1995, Canada and the United States reformed the original treaty
to reflect growing considerations of indigenous peoples’ hunting rights
and to better manage and protect migratory birds.54 The 1995 Protocol
replaced the majority of the original treaty’s provisions.55 It reaffirmed
the parties’ commitment to the long-term conservation of migratory
birds and the need to regulate take of migratory birds.56 The 1995 Protocol thus anticipates that some degree of take coincides with migratory

48. Corcoran & Colbourn, supra note 42, at 362; see HOLLAND & HART, INGAA FOUND.,
DEVELOPMENT OF A PERMIT PROGRAM FOR INCIDENTAL TAKE OF MIGRATORY BIRDS 9–14 (2010),
available at http://www.ingaa.org/File.aspx?id=11062 (comparing and contrasting the
terms and authorizations of each treaty).
49. Compare HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 12 (“Importantly, the Mexico Treaty
does not contain any language limiting the ability of the United States or Mexico to establish laws, regulations and provisions beyond these stated prohibitions, so long as such
laws, regulations and provisions satisfy the need set forth in the convention.”), with id. at 10
(discussing the potential regulation of take in accordance with the terms of the Canada
treaty).
50. 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (defining the MBTA’s prohibitions, commonly referred to collectively as “take”).
51. Canada Treaty, 39 Stat. 1702.
52. Canada Treaty, supra note 51, at Proclamation; see Corcoran & Colbourn, supra note
42, at 362 (characterizing the Canada Treaty’s sole purpose as to protect the economic value
of birds).
53. Canada Treaty, supra note 51, at Proclamation.
54. Protocol Amending the 1916 Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds,
U.S.-Can., Dec. 5, 1995, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 104-28, 1995 WL 877199, at 1 [hereinafter 1995
Protocol].
55. HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 9.
56. 1995 Protocol, supra note 54, at 3; HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 9; see infra
notes 85–87 and accompanying text (outlining the statutory terms of the MBTA and defining “take” in context).
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bird conservation.57 Specifically, the 1995 Protocol states: “Subject to
laws, decrees or regulations . . . , the taking of migratory birds may be
allowed at any time of the year for scientific, educational, propagative, or
other specific purposes consistent with the conservation principles of this
Convention.”58 The phrase “other specific purposes” presents potentially
unlimited take circumstances, but any authorized take must comply with
the 1995 Protocol’s conservation principles.59 The 1995 Protocol grants
the authority to the respective parties to accomplish the conservation
goals through “monitoring, regulation, enforcement and compliance.”60
The conservation principles, however, represent somewhat broad
goals for the protection of migratory birds.61 The 1995 Protocol enumerates five conservation principles: (1) management of migratory birds internationally, (2) guaranteeing various sustainable uses, (3) protecting
healthy bird populations for harvesting, (4) protecting necessary bird
habitat, and (5) restoring diminished bird populations.62 Ultimately, any
taking must not further accelerate the decline of protected birds or destroy necessary habitat.63 Otherwise, the 1995 Protocol affords the parties
and their respective implementing agencies the freedom to regulate take
in accordance with the conservation principles.64
2. The Mexico Treaty
The United States entered into the next migratory bird treaty in
1937 with Mexico.65 The Mexico Treaty declares the protection of migratory birds to be “right and proper . . . in order that the species may not be
exterminated.”66 The treaty further declares the necessity of employing
adequate measures in order to “permit a rational utilization of migratory
birds for the purposes of sport as well as for food, commerce and indus-

57. HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 9 (“Thus, the protocol specifically contemplates
the regulation of take of migratory birds.”).
58. 1995 Protocol, supra note 54, at art. II(3), 4 (emphasis added).
59. HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 9.
60. 1995 Protocol, supra note 54, at art. II(3), 4.
61. See HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 10 (“[A]uthorized take must generally preserve or contribute to migratory bird habitat necessary for the conservation of migratory
birds, and must not contribute to the further decline of depleted populations of migratory
birds.”).
62. 1995 Protocol, supra note 54, at art. II, *4.
63. HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 10.
64. Id.
65. Convention between the United States of America and Mexico for the protection of
migratory birds and game mammals, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 7, 1936, 50 Stat. 1311 [hereinafter Mexico Treaty].
66. Id. at Proclamation.
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try.”67 In comparison to the 1995 Protocol and other MBTA treaties, the
Mexico Treaty allows for the broadest use of migratory birds.68 Further,
the Mexico Treaty only requires the parties to address take by establishing closed hunting seasons and potential take-free refugee zones, and
banning the killing of insectivorous birds.69 Outside of these requirements, the Mexico Treaty allows the parties to regulate take of birds so
long as the parties prevent the extermination of the species.70
3. The Japan Treaty
The United States and Japan signed the next MBTA treaty in
1972.71 The Japan Treaty recognizes that “birds constitute a natural resource of great value for recreational, aesthetic, scientific, and economic
purposes, and that this value can be increased with proper management.”72 Accordingly, the parties agreed to cooperate in managing, protecting, and preventing the extinction of select birds.73 The Japan Treaty
specifically prohibits the taking of migratory birds except in enumerated
circumstances.74 In language very similar to the 1995 Protocol, the Japan
Treaty allows take “[f]or scientific, educational, propagative or other specific purposes not inconsistent with the objectives of this Convention.”75
The Japan Treaty lacks a specific statement of the objectives.76 However,
the Proclamation section of the treaty asserts a desire “to cooperate in
taking measures for the management, protection, and prevention of the
extinction of certain birds.”77 In the broadest sense, the Japan Treaty au-

67. Id.
68. See HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 12 (“Importantly, the Mexico Treaty does
not contain any language limiting the ability of the United States or Mexico to establish
laws, regulations and provisions beyond these stated prohibitions, so long as such laws,
regulations and provisions satisfy the need set forth in the convention.”).
69. Mexico Treaty, supra note 65, at art. II(A)–(F), *1–2.
70. See HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 12 (commenting on the ability of the parties
to regulate take in accordance with the principles of the treaty); Mexico Treaty, supra note
65, at art. I, II(A)–(F), *1–2.
71. Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Japan for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Birds in Danger of Extinction, and Their Environment, U.S.-Japan, Mar. 4, 1972, T.I.A.S. No. 7990, [hereinafter Japan
Treaty].
72. Id. at Proclamation, *1.
73. Id.
74. Id. at art. III(1), *1; see HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 10.
75. Japan Treaty, supra note 71, at art. III(1)(a), *1; HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at
11.
76. HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 11.
77. Japan Treaty, supra note 71, at art. III(1)(a), *1; HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at
11 (theorizing that the objective of the Japan Treaty is to prevent the extinction of certain
species of birds).
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thorizes take so long as it does not pose an extinction risk to bird species
covered by the treaty.78
4. The Russia Treaty
The United States entered into the final MBTA treaty with the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1976.79 In language similar to the
Japan Treaty, the Russia Treaty declares the importance of migratory
birds as “a natural resource of great scientific, economic, aesthetic, cultural, educational, recreational and ecological value and that this value
can be increased under proper management.”80 The parties recognized
the importance of implementing protective measures to curb threats to
certain bird species.81 Accordingly, the parties desired to “cooperate in
implementing measures for the conservation of migratory birds and their
environment . . . .”82 The Russia Treaty specifically forbids the taking of
migratory birds, except “for scientific, educational, propagative, or other
specific purposes not inconsistent with the principles of this Convention.”83 The treaty lacks a specific declaration of its principles, but the
term likely refers to the conservation of migratory birds and their environment.84 Like the Japan Treaty, the Russia Treaty likely allows for take
that comports with the conservation of protected species.
C. Operation of the MBTA
At the MBTA’s inception in 1918, the conservation focus centered
upon population destruction caused by excessive hunting and trafficking

78. HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 11 (“The treaty does not prohibit any take for
purposes consistent with the objectives of the Japan Treaty.”).
79. Convention: Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning the Conservation of Migratory Birds and Their Environment,
U.S.-U.S.S.R., Nov. 19, 1976, T.I.A.S. No. 9073, [hereinafter Russia Treaty]. The Union of
Socialist Soviet Republics collapsed at the end of the Cold War in 1991. See generally Archie
Brown, Reform, Coup and Collapse: The End of the Soviet State, BBC, Feb. 17, 2011, http://
www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/coldwar/soviet_end_01.shtml (outlining the circumstances around the collapse of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics which became present day Russia).
80. Russia Treaty, supra note 79, at Convention, *1; see Japan Treaty, supra note 71, at
Proclamation, *1 (using wording substantially similar to the Russia Treaty declaring the
value of migratory birds).
81. Russia Treaty, supra note 79, at Convention, *1.
82. Id.
83. Id. at art. II(1)(a), *1.
84. HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 11; see Russia Treaty, supra note 79, at Convention, *1.
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in birds.85 Accordingly, the statute uses broad language for what constitutes take.86 The implementing language contains no explicit limitation
that the MBTA applies only to hunting and trafficking.87
The MBTA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior, through the
FWS, to issue regulations implementing the underlying treaties.88 Today,
these regulations protect nearly 850 species of birds, many of which are
common species, like the crow.89 The MBTA also contemplates that some
form of authorized take of protected birds may be allowed under the
treaties.90

85. Scott Finet, Habitat Protection and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 10 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1,
6 n.15 (1996) (“Enactment of the MBTA was a legislative response to the problem of mass
destruction of avian life. At the end of the nineteenth century birds were killed in large
numbers for food, sport and millinery purposes.”); see Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952
F.2d 297, 302 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The definition describes physical conduct of the sort engaged
in by hunters and poachers, conduct which was undoubtedly a concern at the time of the
[MBTA]’s enactment in 1918.”); see also supra notes 14–42 and accompanying text (outlining
the historical circumstances surround the adoption of the MBTA).
86. 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (1918, as amended through 2004); Collette L. Adkins Giese,
Spreading its Wings: Using the Migratory Bird Treaty Act to Protect Habitat, 36 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 1157, 1161 (2010) (“Using very expansive language, section 703 prohibits
taking . . . .”).
87. See Giese, supra note 86, at 1164 (“The MBTA clearly prohibits the taking of migratory birds, but it does not precisely define what activities should constitute a taking.”); but
cf., e.g., HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 4 (“Although the primary purpose of the MBTA
is the prevention of hunting of migratory birds, the statute has been applied to industrial
operations that inadvertently harm migratory birds.”); Benjamin Means, Note, Prohibiting
Conduct, Not Consequences: The Limited Reach of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 823, 823 (1998) (advancing the argument that the public has “[l]ong understood [the
MBTA] simply to regulate hunting”).
88. See 16 U.S.C. § 712(2) (1978, current through 2013).
89. 50 C.F.R. § 10.13 (1973, as amended through 2013) (listing protected species); U.S.
FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., MIGRATORY BIRD MORTALITY: MANY HUMAN-CAUSED THREATS AFFLICT OUR BIRD POPULATIONS (2002), available at http://www.fws.gov/birds/mortality-factsheet.pdf (“Of the 836 species of birds protected under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act,
about a quarter are known to be in trouble.”).
90. 16 U.S.C. § 704(a) (1918, as amended through 1998)
[T]he Secretary of the Interior is authorized and directed, from time to
time, having due regard to the zones of temperature and to the distribution, abundance, economic value, breeding habits, and times and lines of
migratory flight of such birds, to determine when, to what extent, if at all,
and by what means, it is compatible with the terms of the conventions to
allow hunting, taking, capture, killing, possession, sale, purchase, shipment, transportation, carriage, or export of any such bird, or any part,
nest, or egg thereof, and to adopt suitable regulations permitting and governing the same, in accordance with such determinations, which regulations shall become effective when approved by the President.
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The MBTA imposes misdemeanor and felony criminal penalties
on the unauthorized take of protected birds.91 Generally, in the context of
industrial development, only the misdemeanor provision applies.92 It
subjects any person, association, or other business entity to a fine of not
more than $15,000, imprisonment not to exceed six months, or both.93
The U.S. Department of Justice may impose this fine for each violation,
which can add up quickly in the context of large-scale industrial operations.94 More troublingly for industrial operators, the misdemeanor penalties may apply without requiring that the violator has shown any
culpable intent,95 as the statute contains no mens rea element.96 Therefore,
the majority of U.S. Courts of Appeals interpret the MBTA to impose
strict liability for misdemeanor violations.97 A recent body of case law,

91. 16 U.S.C. §§ 707(a)-(d) (1918, as amended through 1998) (allowing for misdemeanor and felony penalties as well as seizure of instruments used to violate the MBTA).
92. See HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 2 (outlining industrial activity that has
resulted in MBTA misdemeanor liability).
93. 16 U.S.C. §707(a).
94. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice (July 10, 2009), available at http://www.fws.gov/
home/feature/2009/pdf/PacficCorpPressRelease.pdf (announcing a plea deal resolving
PacifiCorp’s thirty-four misdemeanor violation charges for a $510,000 fine, in addition to
restitution and avian protection plans that cost the company nearly $15 million); see also
HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 2 (discussing significant penalties paid by serial violators of the MBTA misdemeanor provisions). But see United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F.
Supp. 510, 527–31 (E.D. Cal. 1978) (limiting charges under the MBTA to one charge per
occurrence that kills migratory birds, not basing charges on each bird death); Lilley & Firestone, supra note 14, at 1183 (“In other words, even though many birds died, the defendants
were found guilty for only one bird death.”).
95. See, e.g., United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 685 (10th Cir. 2010)
(“At least seven other circuits either had held that MBTA misdemeanors are strict liability
crimes or noted the MBTA’s lack of mens rea in passing.”).
96. See id. at 684–86 (outlining previous holdings from the Tenth Circuit and other
federal courts of appeals addressing the MBTA’s lack of a mens rea requirement); 16 U.S.C.
§§ 703(a), 707(a).
97. See, e.g., Apollo, 611 F.3d at 685; United States v. Morgan, 311 F.3d 611, 616 (5th Cir.
2002) (“In light of the above case law, the express intent of Congress, and the nature of the
violation, we hold that possessing migratory game birds exceeding the daily bag limit in
violation of the MBTA and its attendant regulations is a strict liability offense.”); United
States v. Pitrone, 115 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1997) (“For most of its existence, the MBTA contained no scienter requirement whatever; its felony provision, like its misdemeanor provision . . . imposed strict liability.”); United States v. Boynton, 63 F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir. 1995)
(“Since the inception of the Migratory Bird Treaty in the early part of this century, misdemeanor violations of the MBTA . . . have been interpreted by the majority of the courts as
strict liability crimes.”); United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 431 (3d Cir. 1986) (“Scienter is
not an element of criminal liability under the Act’s misdemeanor provisions.”); United
States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 907–08 (2d Cir. 1978) (applying strict liability for MBTA
violations stemming from waste ponds using a tort justification for ultra-hazardous
chemicals).
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however, limits the MBTA’s misdemeanor provisions to intentional actions directed at migratory birds.98 The current circuit split creates confusion for the FWS, industry, and district courts in applying the MBTA.
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MBTA
In the 1970s, the FWS began to extend MBTA prosecutions beyond the traditional realm of hunting and wildlife trafficking, and began
to enforce the statute against accidental bird deaths caused by commercial and industrial operations.99 The current MBTA court battles involve
industrial operations that kill birds.100 To date, the FWS has focused its
prosecution of MBTA violations on a handful of industries: wastewater
storage,101 oil and gas,102 electricity transmission,103 and pesticide application.104 Many commentators and industry participants fear wind farms
98. United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1211 (D.N.D. 2012)
(“This Court expressly finds that the use of reserve pits in commercial oil development is
legal, commercially-useful activity that stands outside the reach of the federal Migratory
Bird Treaty Act.”); United States v. Ray Westall Operating, Inc., No. CR-05-1516-MV, 2009
WL 8691615, at *7 (D.N.M. 2009) (“The Court concludes that Congress intended to prohibit
only conduct directed towards birds and did not intend to criminalize negligent acts or
omissions that are not directed at birds, but which incidentally and proximately cause bird
deaths.”); United States v. Chevron USA, Inc., Criminal No. 09-CR-0132, 2009 WL 3645170,
at *3 (W.D. La. 2009) (“These regulations were clearly not intended to apply to commercial
ventures where, occasionally, protected species might be incidentally killed as a result of
totally legal and permissible activities, as happened here.”).
99. See Newton Cnty. Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 115 (8th Cir.
1997) (“Strict liability may be appropriate when dealing with hunters and poachers. But it
would stretch this 1918 statute far beyond the bounds of reason to construe it as an absolute criminal prohibition on conduct, such as timber harvesting, that indirectly results in the
death of migratory birds.”).
100. See, e.g., Brigham Oil & Gas, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1211 (tackling competing case law
applying the MTBA to “indirect, unintentional commercial activity”).
101. See, e.g., FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 904–05 (laying out the factual background of
FMC’s manufacturing of pesticides and the attendant wastewater ponds); see infra notes
102, 104 (listing a few representative cases of MBTA prosecutions of oil and gas wastewater
operations and the pesticide industry).
102. See, e.g., Apollo, 611 F.3d at 682–83 (addressing migratory bird deaths in oil and gas
heater-treaters); Brigham Oil & Gas, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1203–06 (describing oil and gas operations that killed protected birds); Ray Westall Operating, 2009 WL 8691615, at *1–2 (outlining how protected birds were killed in oil and gas waste water ponds); Chevron USA, 2009
WL 3645170, at *1 (discussing how Chevron’s oil and gas operations killed protected birds).
103. See, e.g., United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1071 (D.
Colo. 1999) (laying out the factual background of MTBA violations caused by a rural electrical cooperative’s transmission system).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Rollins, 706 F. Supp. 742, 743–44 (D. Idaho 1989) (describing a how the application of pesticides killed migratory birds); United States v. Corbin
Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 514–15 (E.D. Cal. 1978) (discussing pesticide application to an
alfalfa field that killed migratory birds).
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may be subject to prosecution under the MBTA, and indeed the first ever
prosecution of a wind farm for violations of the MBTA occurred in late
2013.105 In fact, many industry groups and critics of the MBTA claim the
statute technically applies to any conduct that results in the death of a
protected bird,106 such as driving a car, owning a car, or even owning a
home window into which a protected bird flies.107 To limit the potentially
absurd exposure that strict liability for MBTA violations entails, some
courts began applying a proximate causation element to MBTA prosecutions.108 The resulting state of MBTA case law presents a deep circuit
division with conflicting precedent from numerous district courts, creating uncertainty among industrial companies and potentially the FWS.109
105. Press Release, The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Dist. of Wyo., Utility Company
Sentenced in Wyoming for Killing Protected Birds at Wind Projects (Nov. 22, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/wy/news/2013/11november/13-081_nov22.html; Lilley & Firestone, supra note 14, at 1186–93 (predicting whether court will apply the MBTA to
wind farms with each author reaching a different conclusion); John Arnold McKinsey, Regulating Avian Impacts Under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and Other Laws: The Wind Industry
Collides with One of its Own, the Environmental Protection Movement, 28 ENERGY L.J. 71, 85–88
(2007) (discussing three different wind farm projects that have faced environmental pressure and litigation to shut down, one under the MBTA); see THOMAS R. LUNDQUIST ET AL.,
THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT: AN OVERVIEW 2 (2012), available at http://www.crowell.
com/files/the-migratory-bird-treaty-act-an-overview-crowell-moring.pdf (using Lilley and
Firestone’s article to illustrate the uncertainty in how far the MBTA may be extended to
cover industrial activities); see also Flint Hills Tallgrass Prairie Heritage Found. v. Scottish
Power, 147 F. App’x 785 (10th 2005) (per curiam) (The court in Scottish Power tackled a
scatter-gun approach by environmental groups to obtain a temporary restraining order
against a Kansas wind farm. 147 F. App’x at 786–87. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the
MBTA, but the district court threw out the challenge because the MBTA provides no citizen
suit provision. Id. at 787. The circuit court summarily affirmed the district court and chastised the state of the plaintiffs’ record. Id. “On the state of the record, we need not comment
on the district court’s further observation that to hold otherwise, would somehow be ‘tilting at windmills,’ a la Don Quixote.” Id. (citation and footnote omitted)).
106. Lilley & Firestone, supra note 14, at 1182, 1186 (discussing MBTA defendants’ arguments that the MBTA may apply to an unsuspecting motorist that kills a bird or to bird
collisions with building windows); see U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 89 at 2
(presenting data claiming window collisions kill “97 to 976 million birds annually” and cars
account for “60 million” deaths a year).
107. See Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1084 (“As its final argument regarding the MBTA’s proper scope, Moon Lake contends that the government’s interpretation leads to absurd results.”); Larry Martin Corcoran, Migratory Bird Treaty Act: Strict
Criminal Liability for Non-Hunting, human caused bird deaths, 77 DEN. U. L. REV. 315, 340–41
(1999) (addressing the Moon Lake court’s treatment of the absurdity argument).
108. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1085 (“[T]o obtain a guilty verdict
under § 707(a), the government must prove proximate causation . . . .”); see United States v.
Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 690 (10th Cir. 2010) (endorsing Moon Lake’s application
of proximate causation to MBTA prosecutions).
109. See generally Sandra A. Snodgrass, It’s for the Birds—Recent Developments Under the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act and Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, in FEDERAL REGULATION OF
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A. Early Application of the MBTA to Industrial Activities
The first time the MBTA was applied to non-hunting-related industrial activities occurred in a series of three cases in 1973 and 1975 that
prosecuted bird deaths caused by open “toxic oil sludge” wastewater
ponds.110 For example, in United States v. Union Texas Petroleum, the district judge denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss alleging the Government interpreted the MBTA too expansively, commenting “we doubt
that the statute was intended to be limited to hunting or other purposeful killing alone.”111 But despite their new, expansive interpretation
of the MBTA’s scope, the three initial cases offered little guidance as to
the limitations of MBTA liability, as the courts simply denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss and the defendants subsequently entered
pleas.112 However, the cases likely established the FWS’s authority to regulate incidental take by industrial operators under the MBTA.113
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit first tackled an
incidental industrial take issue in 1978.114 In United States v. FMC Corp.,
inspections of a pesticide and chemical company’s wastewater ponds revealed several separate instances of bird deaths due to toxic chemical
exposure in the ponds.115 The company, FMC Corporation, failed to mitigate the exposure problems and the FWS filed charges.116 A jury convicted FMC for misdemeanor violations of the MBTA, and FMC
appealed.117 The court first established that “FMC’s product . . . killed the
CULTURAL RESOURCES, WILDLIFE, AND WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES, Paper No. 10A, 10A-2
(Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn. 2012) (“But this reliance on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion
provides little comfort or certainty to project developers who are trying to obtain financing
and manage project risks.”).
110. Lilley & Firestone, supra note 14, at 1181–82 (discussing the first applications of the
MBTA to incidental taking); see also United States v. Union Tex. Petroleum, No. 73-CR-127,
1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15616, at *8 (D. Colo. July 11, 1973) (rejecting defendants’ motion to
dismiss charges under the MBTA).
111. Union Tex. Petroleum,1973 Dist. LEXIS 15616, at *3.
112. George Cameron Coggins & Sebastian T. Patti, The Resurrection and Expansion of the
Migratory Bird Treat Act, 50 U. COLO. L. REV. 165, 184 (1979) (“These cases are not of much
value as precedent as each was decided without trial and went unreported, and each court
failed to make its premises explicit.”); accord Lilley & Firestone, supra note 14, at 1182 (“It is
difficult to determine the exact[ ]significance of these decisions, as they were ‘not officially
reported.’”).
113. Lilley & Firestone, supra note 14, at 1182 (“Yet, one can surmise that these prosecutions set the stage for future FWS regulation of incidental take.”).
114. See generally United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978).
115. Id. at 904–05.
116. Id. at 905. (“FMC employed guards to keep the birds away, but the guards were
derelict in their duties, sometimes sleeping on the job, and the bird deaths continued.”) (emphasis added).
117. Id. at 904.
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birds”118 then turned to the issue of intent.119 FMC argued that it took no
affirmative action to kill the birds and also had no intent to kill,120 but the
court rejected this argument by reasoning that FMC took an “affirmative
act [when] it engaged in the manufacture of a pesticide known to be
highly toxic,”121 then FMC “failed to act” when the chemical reached a
pond where it could come into contact with protected birds.122 The court
analogized this reasoning to general principles of tort law and strict liability for toxic substances.123 The court dismissed FMC’s argument that it
lacked knowledge of the bird deaths by pointing out that “the statute
does not include as an element of the offense ‘willfully, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently.’”124 Ultimately, commentators and other courts
criticized the Second Circuit’s application of criminal strict liability
based on tort principles.125 However, FMC Corp. laid the groundwork as
the first major circuit court decision upholding strict liability for industrial activities under the MBTA.126
B. The Rogue Circuits
In the 1990s, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits each tackled incidental
take stemming from another industrial activity—logging.127 In both Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans and Newton County Wildlife Association v. U.S.

118. Id. at 906.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 907.
122. Id.
123. Id. (“The principle here is the same as in the tort situation even though in this case
the carbofuran remained on the property of FMC, and the birds found their way to the
attracting FMC pond.”).
124. Id. at 908.
125. Corcoran, supra note 107, at 333 (“Commentators have observed that the Second
Circuit relied upon the ultra hazardous nature of pesticide manufacture, and that in future
MBTA cases the Second Circuit may not deem criminal seemingly less-hazardous activities
that result in unintended deaths of migratory birds.”); Means, supra note 87, at 837 (“Both
FMC and Corbin have been distinguished in subsequent MBTA litigation on the grounds
that they constituted an exception to the normal operation of the MBTA—a gentle way of
dispensing with a quasi-tort principle that finds no support in the law.”).
126. Kalyani Robbins, Paved with Good Intentions: The Fate of Strict Liability Under the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 42 ENVTL. L. 579, 598 (2012) (“While this case has been highly
regarded and often cited—after all, until [2010] it was the only appellate case on the matter—it is also well over three decades old . . . .”).
127. See generally Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991); Newton
Cnty. Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110 (8th Cir. 1997).
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Forest Service, environmental groups challenged the sale of logging permits, in part because the logging could potentially kill migratory birds.128
The holding in Seattle Audubon Society represents the first major
limitation on liability under the MBTA. Two Audubon societies challenged the sale of timber permits because the logging would destroy
northern spotted owl habitat and thereby kill protected birds.129 The
court determined the definition of take in the MBTA and FWS regulations “describes physical conduct of the sort engaged in by hunters and
poachers, conduct which was undoubtedly a concern at the time of the
statute’s enactment in 1918.”130 The court rejected the contention that the
MBTA applied to “habitat modification or destruction.”131
In support of this position, the court compared the MBTA’s definition of “take” to the same term used in Endangered Species Act
(ESA).132 When Congress enacted the ESA, it included the term “harm” in
the definition of “take.”133 The FWS further defined ESA “harm” “to include habitat modification or degradation.”134 Therefore, the court reasoned, the ESA’s definition encompassed a broader range of take than
the MBTA, which does not include “harm” under the definition of
take.135 The court bolstered this conclusion by pointing out that Congress
had not amended the MBTA after the enactment of the ESA to include
the ESA’s more expansive definition of “harm.”136
The court then turned to the holdings in FMC Corp. and United
States v. Corbin Farm Services, which had applied the MBTA to industrial
activities, pesticide wastewater ponds, and pesticide application respectively.137 Even though these two cases applied the MBTA to the “direct,
128. See Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 952 F.2d at 298–99, 302; Newton Cnty. Wildlife Ass’n, 113
F.3d at 111.
129. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 952 F.2d at 298–99, 302. The Ninth Circuit consolidated cases
involving challenges from both Seattle and Portland Audubon Societies. Id. at 298–99. The
respective district courts denied injunctive relief to each society. Id.
130. Id. at 302. (citing 50 C.F.R. § 10.12). The court neglected to provide a date for the
Code of Federal Regulations cited. However, the definition of “take” remained the same
from the Seattle Audubon Society decision to today. See generally Revision of Regulations
Implementing Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species Wild Fauna and
Flora, 50 CFR Parts 10, 13, 17, and 23, 72 Fed. Reg. 48402-01, 48404 (Aug. 23, 2007) (outlining changes to 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 in the 2007 revisions, the only revisions after the Seattle
Audubon Society decision).
131. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 952 F.2d at 302.
132. Id. at 303.
133. Id.
134. Id. (citing 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (no date provided)).
135. Id.
136. Id. (“We agree with the Seattle district court that the differences in the proscribed
conduct under the ESA and the MBTA are ‘distinct and purposeful.’”).
137. Id.
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though unintended” killing of protected birds, the Ninth Circuit rejected
the extrapolation that these holdings covered indirect, unintended bird
deaths.138 Ultimately, the court determined “habitat destruction causes
‘harm’ to the owls under the ESA but does not ‘take’ them within the
meaning of the MBTA.”139
Building upon the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Seattle Audubon Society, the Eighth Circuit also declined to adopt an expansive definition of
take for indirect, unintentional bird deaths.140 In Newton County Wildlife
Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Service, several plaintiffs sought review of timber
sales, alleging that the sales would “disrupt nesting migratory birds, killing some,” in violation of the MBTA.141 As the plaintiffs put it, these potential killings would “violate [the] MBTA’s absolute prohibition against
killing or taking nesting birds.”142
The court disagreed. First, it declared the MBTA only proscribed
“conduct directed at migratory birds.”143 “Hunters and poachers” may
face strict liability for bird deaths, but the court refused to extend MBTA
liability any further.144 “[I]t would stretch this 1918 statute far beyond the
bounds of reason to construe it as an absolute criminal prohibition on
conduct, such as timber harvesting, that indirectly results in the death of
migratory birds.”145 The Eighth Circuit based this judicial limitation of
the MBTA on the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the MBTA’s take prohibition in Seattle Audubon Society.146
Newton County Wildlife Ass’n and Seattle Audubon Society paved
the way for judicial limitations on liability under the MBTA.147 Under
these holdings, if a company or federal agency undertook actions that
indirectly and unintentionally killed protected birds, they were not
liable.148

138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Newton Cnty. Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 115 (8th Cir. 1997).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. (quoting Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 302 (9th Cir. 1991)).
147. Helen M. Kim, Chopping Down the Birds: Logging and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act,
31 ENVTL. L. 125, 129 (2001) (referencing a circuit split in the application of the MBTA
driven, in part, by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits’ limitations on indirect conduct
prosecutions).
148. See, e.g., United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1213
(D.N.D. 2012) (“This Court believes that it is highly unlikely that Congress ever intended to
impose criminal liability on the acts or omissions of persons involved in lawful commercial
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C. The Modern Strict Liability Approach
In 2010, the Tenth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc. set a new course. It firmly established strict liability under the
MBTA, even for unintentional killings.149 The defendants were oil field
operators in Kansas that used devices called “heater-treaters” at their
well sites to separate contaminants (like water) from hydrocarbons.150
Birds had a tendency to make nests inside heater-treater exhaust pipes
and louvers.151 After receiving a tip, the FWS inspected the heater-treaters of companies in the region and discovered roughly 300 dead birds, 10
of which the MBTA protected.152 The FWS did not initially prosecute, but
instead allowed the companies a “grace period” and began an education
program aimed at preventing the bird deaths.153 The campaign reached
one of the operators but not the other.154
After the public education program’s grace period terminated, the
FWS inspected the operators’ equipment again.155 The search yielded five
dead birds that were protected by the MBTA.156 This time, FWS prosecuted and the operators challenged the application of strict liability
under the MBTA, as well as the statute’s constitutionality on due process
grounds.157
The Tenth Circuit addressed the strict liability issue first.158 The
court established the MBTA’s take provision lacked a mens rea requirement, using another Tenth Circuit case, Unites States v. Corrow, for support.159 The Corrow court had declared: “Simply stated, then, ‘it is not

activity which may indirectly cause the death of birds protected under the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act.”).
149. United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 684-86 (10th Cir. 2010).
150. Id. at 682–83; see Oil Treating, KW INTERNATIONAL, http://www.kwintl.com/oiltreating.html (last visited May 7, 2013) (describing how KW International’s vertical heatertreater separates out water, gas, and oil); CO. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH & ENV’T - AIR POLLUTION CONTROL DIV., HEATER-TREATER SOURCE CATEGORY 1, 5–6, available at http://www.
colorado.gov/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheadername1=Content-Disposition&blob
headername2=Content-Type&blobheadervalue1=inline%3B+filename%3D%22Heater+
Treaters.pdf%22&blobheadervalue2=application%2Fpdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=Mungo
Blobs&blobwhere=1251808868243&ssbinary=true (describing heater-treaters and providing
various diagrams).
151. Apollo, 611 F.3d at 682.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 682–83.
155. Id. at 683.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 684.
159. Id. (citing United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 805 (10th Cir. 1997)).
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necessary to prove that a defendant violated the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act with specific intent or guilty knowledge.’”160 The court in Apollo interpreted Corrow’s holding to mean that the MBTA’s misdemeanor provisions lacked the need to establish “any particular state of mind or
scienter,”161 noting also that Corrow followed seven other circuits at the
time in applying strict liability to MBTA misdemeanor violations.162 The
operators argued their conduct was passive, and that, in the words of the
court, “they merely failed to bird-proof the heater-treaters.”163 The operators sought for the court to apply the Eighth Circuit’s holding in
Newton,164 but the Tenth Circuit rejected the application of Newton because the panel believed it only applied to adverse modification of bird
habitat, rather than the clear take of protected birds.165 The court thus
definitively declared its stance on the MBTA: strict liability, period.166
While the MBTA’s scope, like any statute, can test the far
reaches in application, we do not have that case before us. The
question here is whether unprotected oil field equipment can
take or kill migratory birds. It is obvious the oil equipment
can. Simply put, the take and kill provisions of the Act are not
outside the holding of Corrow.167

The court then turned to the operators’ constitutional challenge
that the MBTA was a violation of due process.168 The court distilled the
operators’ due process argument into two issues: an alleged lack of fair
notice as to what conduct the statute prohibits, and the operators’ alleged inability to know their actions would lead to the deaths of protected birds.169 First, the court acknowledged that due process requires
citizens be given fair notice of what conduct is criminalized by a statute.170 The operators contended they were without notice of the conduct
prohibited by the MBTA,171 but the court rejected this argument because
160. Corrow, 119 F.3d at 805.
161. Apollo, 611 F.3d at 684 (citing Corrow, 119 F.3d at 805).
162. Id. at 685.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 686 (citing Newton Cnty. Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110 (8th
Cir. 1997) (refusing to apply the MBTA to potential take caused by the sale of logging
permits)).
165. Id.
166. Id. (“As a matter of statutory construction, the ‘take’ provision of the [MBTA] does
not contain a scienter requirement.”).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 682.
169. Id. at 687.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 688.
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in its view the MBTA clearly criminalized all conduct that “will lead to
the death or captivity of protected migratory birds . . . .”172 The court
further explained “[t]he actions criminalized by the MBTA may be legion, but they are not vague.”173 Ultimately, the court found the MBTA
afforded fair warning of its prohibitions.174
Addressing the second prong of the operators’ constitutional challenge, the court also acknowledged that it is unconstitutional to criminalize acts that a defendant does not cause.175 The second issue came down
to whether the operators received “notice of predicate acts”—in this case,
whether the operators knew their heater-treaters could kill migratory
birds.176 The court analogized notice to proximate causation:177
We agree with the district court’s assessment of proximate
cause. Central to all of the Supreme Court’s cases on the due
process constraints on criminal statutes is foreseeability—
whether it is framed as a constitutional constraint on causation
. . . and mental state . . . , or whether it is framed as a presumption in statutory construction. When the MBTA is stretched to
criminalize predicate acts that could not have been reasonably
foreseen to result in a proscribed effect on birds, the statute
reaches its constitutional breaking point.178

Thus, the proximate cause issue rested on notice—whether the industry was on notice that its operations could kill birds.179 The FWS had
warned one of the operators about the risks heater-treaters posed, but
had only notified the other operator after a charge had been filed.180 The
Tenth Circuit thus affirmed the convictions for which the FWS had provided notice, but overturned the one conviction of the operator that had
not been notified that the heater-treaters could kill migratory birds.181
Thus, the Apollo decision, as the most recent circuit court MBTA decision,
stands for two important propositions: first, the MBTA misdemeanor
provisions are strict liability offenses; second, a conviction under the
MBTA requires a showing of proximate cause—essentially demonstrat-

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 688 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 703).
689.
at 698–99.
at 687.
at 688, 691.
at 689–690.
at 690.
at 691.
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ing that the offender was on notice that his conduct may violate the
MBTA.182
D. The District Court Revolt
Despite the persuasiveness of Apollo, district courts have been reluctant to extend or follow its reasoning.183 The most notable decision,
United States v. Brigham Oil and Gas, L.P., comes from the District of
North Dakota, in the Eighth Circuit.184 In Brigham, the court was deciding
on a motion to dismiss from three oil field operators who faced MBTA
misdemeanors for dead birds found in wastewater reserve pits.185 The
court adopted a narrow reading of the MBTA’s take prohibition that
only encompassed intentional acts directed towards migratory birds.186
The court ultimately declared that Congress did not intend to criminalize
conduct “which may indirectly cause the death of birds protected under
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.”187
The court took the view that the MBTA’s prohibition of take was
limited to direct acts of bird killing, not indirect acts that caused accidental deaths.188 “In the context of the Act, ‘take’ refers to conduct directed at
birds, such as hunting and poaching, and not acts or omissions having
merely the incidental or unintended effect of causing bird deaths.”189 The
court turned to the dictionary definition of take and concluded, “the definition involves deliberate, not accidental, conduct. It refers to a purposeful attempt to possess wildlife through capture, not incidental or
accidental taking through lawful commercial activity.”190 It further sup-

182. Id.; see Robbins, supra note 126, at 601 (“The Apollo Energies court took the expectation that parties be on notice of the potential for regulation of their activities and twisted it
into a requirement that the government provide individualized written notice of each particular risk of harm in order to hold the parties responsible for that harm.”).
183. See, e.g., United States v. Chevron USA, Inc., Criminal No. 09-CR-0132, 2009 WL
3645170, at *5 (W.D. La. Oct. 30, 2009) (“To the extent that the court’s decision in Apollo is
inconsistent with the reasoning in this case, the undersigned simply declines to adopt the
reasoning and rationale of that decision.” (emphasis added)); but see United States v. CITGO
Petroleum Corp., 893 F. Supp. 2d 841, 847 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (“After a thorough review of the
relevant case law, the Court agrees with the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Apollo Energies that
it is obvious that ‘unprotected oil field equipment can take or kill migratory birds.’” (quoting Apollo, 611 F.3d at 686)).
184. United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (D.N.D. 2012).
185. Id. at 1203.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1213.
188. Id. at 1208.
189. Id. (emphasis added).
190. Id. 1208–09 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (UNABRIDGED) 2329–30 (1986)).

R
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ported its reading of take by relying upon the Eighth and Ninth Circuits’
opinions in Newton and Seattle Audubon Society,191 interpreting them to
forbid prosecution under the MBTA for any indirect activity that kills
protected birds.192
The court also relied upon an unreported case from the District of
New Mexico (Tenth Circuit) that was decided prior to Apollo.193 In United
States v. Ray Westall Operating, the district court declined to extend the
MBTA to bird deaths in an oil and gas wastewater pond.194
The Court finds that it is highly unlikely that Congress intended to impose criminal liability on every person that indirectly causes the death of a migratory bird. The Court
concludes that Congress intended to prohibit only conduct directed towards birds and did not intend to criminalize negligent acts or omissions that are not directed at birds, but which
incidentally and proximately cause bird deaths.195

The Brigham court noted “reserve pits are not directed at birds or their
habitat.”196 The court acknowledged the contrary precedent in other circuits set by FMC Corp. and Apollo, but adhered to the interpretation of
Newton.197
This Court expressly finds that the use of reserve pits in commercial oil development is legal, commercially-useful activity
that stands outside the reach of the federal Migratory Bird
Treaty Act. Like timber harvesting, oil development and production activities are not the sort of physical conduct engaged
in by hunters and poachers, and such activities do not fall
under the prohibitions of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Newton C[ou]nty
is controlling precedent which this Court is obligated to
follow.198

191. Id. at 1209–10 (citing Newton Cnty. Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110
(8th Cir. 1997) and Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991)).
192. Id. (“Other courts have recognized that lawful commercial activity, such as logging, that is unrelated to hunting or poaching and not directed at birds does not constitute
a crime under the federal Migratory Bird Treaty Act.”).
193. Id. at 1210–11 (citing United States v. Ray Westall Operating, Inc., No. CR-05-1516MV, 2009 WL 8691615 (D.N.M. Feb. 25, 2009)).
194. Ray Westall Operating, Inc., 2009 WL 8691615.
195. Id. at *7 (quoted by Brigham Oil & Gas, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1210).
196. Brigham Oil & Gas, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1211.
197. Id. (citing United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679 (10th Cir. 2010) and
United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978)).
198. Id.
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Ultimately, the Brigham court found that if the MBTA were interpreted to encompass any conduct that proximately caused a bird death,
the statute would impose liability on commonplace activities like pruning trees, reaping crops, driving a car, owning windows, or even owning
a cat.199 The court cited a 2002 FWS study on causes of bird mortality,
which estimated 100 million to one billion birds were killed each year
from collisions with building windows.200 The court rejected the government’s argument that all of these activities were open to prosecution
under the MBTA.201 “[T]he Government would have to criminalize driving, construction, airplane flights, farming, electricity and wind turbines,
which cause bird deaths, and many other everyday lawful activities.”202
No clear consensus exists among commentators, FWS personnel,
industry, or the courts on how to apply the MBTA.203 The current MBTA
atmosphere results in varying judicial approaches from circuit to circuit
and from district to district.204 The confusion creates an extremely difficult atmosphere for industry to operate within.205 However, a solution
199. Id. at 1212–13.
200. Id. (quoting U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 89, at 2).
201. Id. at 1213.
202. Id. (“In summary, the Federal Migratory Bird Treaty Act, as broadly interpreted by
the Government, offers unlimited potential for criminal prosecutions. The U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Service has recognized countless numbers of ways in which otherwise lawful actions may result in the unintended death of migratory birds.”).
203. See, e.g., id. (restricting the MBTA to conduct directed at birds like hunting and
poaching); Means, supra note 87, at 841 (“The MBTA’s plain meaning and legislative history require a restrained interpretation.”); but see, e.g., United States v. Apollo Energies,
Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 686 (10th Cir. 2010) (upholding MBTA convictions for unintentional and
indirect actions causing protected bird deaths); Julie Lurman, Agencies in Limbo: Migratory
Birds and Incidental Take by Federal Agencies, 23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 39, 60 (2007) (“Incidental taking by land clearance must not be allowed to continue unchecked and unmonitored.”); Robbins, supra note 126, at 581 (“The strict liability offenses found in the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) should be enforced with the purest form of strict liability . . . .”); see also LUNDQUIST, supra note 105, at 4 (“Many commentators and companies are
not comfortable with fuzzy potential MBTA liability and with reliance on uncertain
prosecutorial discretion to avoid criminal liability for an otherwise-lawful land use.”).
204. Compare Apollo, 611 F.3d at 686 (imposing strict liability, limited by proximate
cause, to industrial activities that unintentionally and indirectly caused protected bird
deaths), with United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1213 (D.N.D. 2012)
(limiting the MBTA to apply only to intentional conduct directed towards protected birds,
and specifically allowing lawful industrial activity to kill birds). See Scott W. Brunner, The
Prosecutor’s Vulture: Inconsistent MBTA Prosecution, its Clash with Wind Farms, and How to Fix
It, SEATTLE J. ENVTL. L., 2013, at 27, http://www.sjel.org/images/pdf/2013/brunner_prosecutors%20vulture.pdf (“A judicial carve-out is an ill-fit fix to the MBTA’s inconsistent application because carve-outs have already been utilized by some courts, and MBTA
application has simply been made less uniform as a result.”).
205. HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 2 (“Although actions under the MBTA have not
historically been brought against developers of natural gas pipelines projects, without any

R

R
R

R
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does exist—at least a solution to bring industrial projects into compliance with the MBTA while still furthering the original goals of the statute. Congress and the FWS should authorize and develop an incidental
take program for industrial projects.
III. AUTHORIZING INCIDENTAL TAKE
Congress and the FWS should act to alleviate the confusion surrounding the MBTA. There are essentially two options for this. First,
Congress could amend the statute, redefining the MBTA’s take prohibition to specifically include or exclude incidental take. Second, Congress
could authorize an incidental take permit program. Alternately, the FWS
may be able to implement an incidental take permit program under its
existing powers without congressional approval. The first option comes
with significant political and administrative drawbacks, while the second option—an incidental take permit program—could be tailored to
eliminate the confusion surrounding the MBTA without reducing the
protective power of the MBTA.
A. Congressional Amendment to the MBTA
In an ideal political climate, the fastest and most effective option
to provide certainty for the FWS and industrial operators rests with Congress.206 Congress has two viable options to reform the MBTA to allow
for incidental take. First, Congress can amend the statutory language of
the MBTA to apply only to intentional takings.207 This would result in
more certainty as to whether industrial operators face liability, but the
amendment may also place migratory birds in greater danger from in-

permit mechanism to allow the incidental take of migratory birds as a result of natural gas
pipeline construction activities, pipeline companies have no assurance they can abide by
the Act and avert lawsuits.”); Lilley & Firestone, supra note 14, at 1209 (“[T]he exercise of
prosecutorial discretion and lack of enforcement action by FWS and state agencies fails to
provide wind farm operators with proper incentives to prevent or minimize wildlife impacts.”); McKinsey, supra note 105, at 89 (“The uncertainty brought on by reliance on selective enforcement of the MBTA is perhaps the most difficult risk to precisely assess.”).
206. See Lilley & Firestone, supra note 14, at 1210 (“Congress should amend the MBTA
to grant incidental-take permits and require FWS to adopt regulations specifying the criteria for issuing such permits and standards for compliance with them.”).
207. See Brunner, supra note 204, at 29–32 (discussing options to amend the statutory
language of the MBTA to prevent confusion); McKinsey, supra note 105, at 91 (advocating
for a statutory limitation of the MBTA’s take definition to exempt wind farms).
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creased industrial development, be it wind, oil and gas, transmission,
pesticides, or even skyscraper construction.208
Second, Congress can require the FWS to implement an incidental
take permit program.209 An incidental take program would allow the
FWS to approve permits for a regulated number of bird deaths caused by
permittees. Such a program would provide more protection to industry
operators that accidentally kill protected birds, but it would also allow
the FWS to regulate migratory birds deaths and provide for more effective mitigation measures.210 There could be some disadvantages, however. Delays may result from an over-stretched FWS and a lack of
manpower. The permit program could also prove too costly for some
project managers, and some may opt to risk the chance of killing protected birds and potential MBTA prosecution.211 Considering the relative
merits of each system, the implementation of an incidental take permit
program would best provide certainty to industry and uphold the conservation ideals of the MBTA and its implementing treaties.
1. Redefining “Take” to Exclude Incidental and Unintentional Actions
Congress could resolve the confusion in the circuits by simply
clarifying the scope of the word “take.”212 The majority of redefinition
proposals focus on exemptions for wind farms, but few call for exemptions for all other industrial operations.213 For example, one commentator
recommends the 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) take provision should read:
[I]t shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any
manner, excepting therein incidental harm or death to birds occurring from birds striking structures, including rotating or stationary
208. See Brunner, supra note 204, at 25 (suggesting that a statutory redefinition of take to
exclude incidental commercial activities represents a fair and balanced approach to industrial take).
209. Lilley & Firestone, supra note 14, at 1210 (arguing for congressional amendment
authorizing incidental take).
210. See HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 2–3 (listing the benefits of an incidental
take permit program including certainty, lack of lawsuits, habitat restoration, and
conservation).
211. See id. at 37 (reasoning the incidental take permit program must be easy to implement to ease the workload on the FWS); Lurman, supra note 203, at 58 (discussing the
difficulties posed to the FWS by implementing and managing a federal incidental take
permit).
212. Brunner, supra note 204, at 29; see 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2011) (providing the MBTA’s
misdemeanor statutory trigger); 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (2013) (defining FWS interpretation of
take); see generally supra notes 127–182 and accompanying text (explaining the circuit split
in detail).
213. See McKinsey, supra note 105, at 91; Brunner, supra note 204, at 29–31 (criticizing
the narrow approach only allowing incidental take from wind farms).
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wind energy turbine blades reasonably designed to minimize such
collisions, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill . . . any migratory
bird . . . .214

Notably, the definition appears to only exempt wind farms and potential
collisions with structures.215 The scope of liability then turns on the definition of “structure.”216 Narrowly construed, “structure” might not cover
oil reserve pits,217 logging and logging permits,218 electrocutions from
transmission lines,219 or bird deaths resulting from nesting in heatertreaters.220 Certainly, the term “structure” will not cover deaths from
pesticide applications,221 or, at the logical extreme, cars and cats.222 Therefore, while this proposed redefinition may encourage wind energy
production, it does little to protect other industrial operators from MBTA
liability.223 Furthermore, this sort of narrow redefinition ineffectively addresses the larger ambiguities in the MBTA.
A broader redefinition of take—one that excludes liability for incidental bird killings more generally—would likely cure the MBTA’s ambiguity, but it would also eviscerate the MBTA’s protections against

214. McKinsey, supra note 105, at 91 (emphasis added), quoted in Brunner, supra note
204, at 29–30.
215. McKinsey, supra note 105, at 91 (“Logically, Congress should either withdraw its
support of renewable energy values or complete its promotion and clear the left over environmental policy of the MBTA.”); Brunner, supra note 204, at 30 (“McKinsey’s language
successfully relieves wind-turbine operators (that meet certain design requirements) from
MBTA liability.”).
216. Brunner, supra note 204, at 30.
217. See United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1211 (D.N.D. 2012)
(holding that wastewater pits were outside the MBTA’s reach).
218. See Newton Cnty. Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 115 (8th Cir.
1997) (limiting the definition of take to apply only to hunting and poaching, or activities
directed at protected birds).
219. See United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1071 (D. Colo.
1999) (convicting a rural electricity cooperative for protected bird electrocutions).
220. See United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 682 (10th Cir. 2010) (upholding MBTA convictions for bird deaths in oil field equipment).
221. See United States v. Rollins, 706 F. Supp. 742, 745 (D. Idaho 1989) (overturning a
magistrate judge’s conviction for application of pesticides).
222. See generally Brigham Oil & Gas, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1212–13 (highlighting the staggering number of bird deaths caused by cars and cats and how the government chooses not
to prosecute those cases); U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 89, at 2 (outlining the
various causes of protected bird deaths, many of which are everyday activities like driving
cars and owning pets).
223. Brunner, supra note 204, at 30 (“But McKinsey’s language leaves open the likeliness
that other industry-types incidentally killing migratory birds, such as oil companies and
pesticides users . . . , would remain subject to the MBTA: oil pits and crop fields could
incidentally lead to bird deaths, and these items do not expressly meet the characterization
of a ‘structure.’”).

R
R
R
R

R

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMN\54-1\NMN104.txt

Spring 2014]

unknown

Seq: 29

25-APR-14

OVERHAULING THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT

8:48

135

incidental activities that severely impact protected bird populations. For
example, one commentator, in rejecting a narrow definition, suggests
broader language:
It shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner, excepting therein incidental harm or death to birds
(1) occurring from birds striking structures reasonably designed to minimize such collisions, or
(2) resulting from commercial or industrial operations unrelated to hunting, gaming, or poaching practices if the
commercial or industrial operations are reasonably designed to minimize such harm or death to birds.224

This redefinition would explicitly exempt wind farms and industrial operators from liability for incidental deaths.225 However, the interjection of
a “reasonable” standard may complicate future prosecution and subject
the MBTA to further ambiguity.226 For example, the number of bird fatalities caused by wind farms is often staggering.227 Yet, from the perspective of proponents of wind development, the number of turbine
collisions may seem reasonable,228 while a lower number of bird deaths
caused by oil reserve pits may not seem reasonable.229 In either case, the
environmental community would likely lobby strongly against such a
broad redefinition of MBTA take and the FWS may oppose the amendment as well.230 Furthermore, this sort of redefinition would likely jetti-

224. Brunner, supra note 204, at 31 (emphasis added).
225. Id. (“This language would capture, for example, oil pits that are designed in a way
that can reasonably prevent bird deaths.”).
226. See generally McKinsey, supra note 105, at 90 (“In essence then, the policy question
is one of how much energy a bird is worth, and whether it is worth more renewable energy
than non-renewable energy.”).
227. See, e.g., Hadassah M. Reimer & Sandra A. Snodgrass, Tortoises, Bats, and Birds, Oh
My: Protected-Species Implication for Renewable Energy Projects, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 545, 563
(2010) (discussing bird mortality from direct collisions with wind farms using 2001 numbers based upon 15,000 operating wind turbines in the United States); Cappiello, supra note
223 (referencing a 2013 study placing the number of birds killed annually by wind farms at
573,000).
228. See McKinsey, supra note 105, at 90 (“The wind energy industry would emphasize
that a bird killed for a megawatt-hour of renewable, non-foreign wind energy is much
more acceptable than a bird killed for a unit of foreign[-]purchased or non-renewable
energy.”).
229. See id.
230. Id. at 90 (“Resolution to this conflict is perhaps stymied by the failure of an important ally to renewable energy, the environmental protection collective, to consider softening
any environmental law.”); see HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 37 (discussing the FWS’s
belief that any regulatory take permit must “provide conservation benefits to, and protect,
migratory birds”).
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son most of the MBTA’s current protections that go beyond direct and
intentional killings to conserve an already strained U.S. bird population.231 Although the broad redefinition might provide certainty to industry, the diminished protections for migratory birds makes such a
congressional amendment unlikely.
2. Congressionally Mandated Incidental Take Permit Program
Alternately, Congress could amend the MBTA and require the
FWS to implement an incidental take permit program. This would have
certain advantages over a program developed by the FWS under its own
authority, as discussed below. Explicit congressional authorization of an
incidental take program would prevent administrative obstacles that
would arise in FWS rulemaking, including the foundational question of
whether the FWS even has the power to authorize an incidental take program, without congressional approval, according to its delegation of authority under the MBTA.232 Congress may also be able to authorize an
incidental permit program more quickly than if the FWS were to create
the program through its cumbersome rulemaking process.233 Finally,
congressional authorization would remove ambiguity and potential litigation over the validity of an incidental take program developed by the
FWS.234 Although congressional action presents the cleanest route to authorizing incidental industrial take, Congress has not taken action to implement such a broad program in the MBTA’s 96-year history.235
Congress has, however, acted to implement a narrower incidental
take permit under the MBTA for military training exercises that may
serve as a model for a more expansive program.236 In 2002, the U.S. Dis-

231. HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 2 (referencing studies showing “widespread
declines in bird populations in the United States”).
232. Pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2011), the Secretary of the Interior, and not merely
FWS, has authority to permit take or killing of migratory birds in certain circumstances so
long as the take is not inconsistent with the treaties. But see HOLLAND & HART, supra note
48, at 1 (commenting on the vulnerability of agencies violating the MBTA to citizen suits
under the APA).
233. McKinsey, supra note 105, at 91.
234. Id.; HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 27 (mentioning how no judicial challenges
arose after the FWS implemented an incidental take program for military training after
congressional authorization).
235. See Brunner, supra note 204, at 28 (“However, since 1918, the MBTA has only been
altered to reflect more bilateral treaties that the United States entered, or to update monetary fine amounts.” (footnote omitted)).
236. See generally 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2011) (statutory note) (directing the Secretary of the
Interior to develop regulations allowing incidental take for military training exercises);
HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 30 (arguing that the military incidental take provision
provides a base framework upon which a broader program may be based on).
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trict Court for the District of Columbia held that live-fire military training exercises that killed protected birds violated the MBTA.237 Finding
this limitation on military preparedness unacceptable, Congress responded by authorizing the FWS, in conjunction with the military, to
implement incidental take permits for military readiness activities.238 The
rule placed certain limitations upon the military’s activities, including
requiring mitigation, minimization, and monitoring of migratory bird
take during the training exercises.239 The FWS may issue permits authorizing incidental take to the extent the agency believes the take conforms
with the MBTA and the original treaties’ terms.240
The military incidental take program could be used as a model for
a broader incidental take program. The congressional conference report
explicitly states that the military training incidental take permit amendment comports with the United States’ treaty obligations underlying the
MBTA,241 and the FWS has acknowledged this.242 Although these affirmations arise in the context of military training exercises because Congress
and FWS believe that incidental take comports with the underlying trea-

237. Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. Pirie (Pirie I), 191 F. Supp. 2d 161, 163–64 (D.D.C.
2002) (finding the military in violation of the MBTA), superseded by statute, 16 U.S.C. § 703
(2011) (statutory note), as recognized in Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. England, No.
00cv03044, 2003 WL 179848, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 23, 2003).; Ctr. For Biological Diversity v.
Pirie (Pirie II), 201 F. Supp. 2d 113, 123 (D.D.C. 2002) (granting the injunction after a separate remedies hearing and briefing to Pirie I); Migratory Bird Permits; Take of Migratory
Birds by the Armed Forces, 72 Fed. Reg. 8931-01, 8933 (Feb. 28, 2007) (codified at 50 C.F.R.
§ 21.15 (2007)); see also HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 24 (“The need for this permit
program arose, in part, from a 2002 federal district court ruling that held that military
training exercises of the Department of the Navy that resulted in incidental take of migratory birds without a permit violated the MBTA.”).
238. Migratory Bird Permits; Take of Migratory Birds by the Armed Forces, 72 Fed.
Reg. 8931-01, 8933 (Feb. 28, 2007) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 21.15).
239. Id.
240. Id.; HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 25 (“As an initial matter, the Service recognized broad authority under the MBTA to promulgate regulations allowing for the take of
migratory birds when compatible with the terms of the migratory bird treaties.”).
241. H.R. Rep. No. 107-772, at 624 (2002) (Conf. Rep.); see also HOLLAND & HART, supra
note 48, at 25 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 107-722, at 625 (2002) (Conf. Rep.)); News Release,
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Proposes Rule to Allow Defense
Department To Take Migratory Birds (May 28, 2004), available at http://www.fws.gov/
mountain-prairie/pressrel/dc%20408.htm (“The 2003 Defense Authorization Act conference report notes specifically that Congress found the authorization for incidental take to
be consistent with the underlying treaty obligations of the United States.”).
242. Migratory Bird Permits; Take of Migratory Birds by the Armed Forces, 72 Fed.
Reg. 8931-01, 8932 (Feb. 28, 2007) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 21.15) (“In passing the Authorization Act, Congress itself determined that allowing incidental take of migratory birds as a
result of military readiness activities is consistent with the MBTA and the treaties.”), quoted
in HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 25.
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ties, the groundwork has been laid for subsequent amendments to
MBTA incidental take.243 Congress’s finding that the killing of protected
birds by military exercises is permissible under the MBTA shows Congress does not believe incidental take will breach the underlying treaties,
which would subject the treaties to cancellation by the partner countries.244 Therefore, the military training incidental take legislation and
subsequent rulemaking has laid the groundwork for a broader revision
to the MBTA allowing for general incidental take.245 However, given the
current political deadlock in Congress, congressional action may be unlikely and, even if attempted, untimely.246

243. HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 30 (“[A]uthorization of incidental take of migratory birds as a result of military readiness activities lays the foundation for a permit
program for non-federal entities because it shows that Congress and the Service believe
that certain incidental take is consistent with the United States’ treaty obligations.”).
244. Compare CONG. RESEARCH SERV., S. PRT. 106-71, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 193 (2001), available at http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-106SPRT66922/pdf/CPRT-106SPRT66922.pdf (“[A] material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the other to invoke the breach
as a ground for terminating the treaty in whole or in part.”), with HOLLAND & HART, supra
note 48, at 13 (“The Senate has made clear that the United States is to interpret the treaty in
accordance with the common understanding of the treaty shared by the President and the
Senate at the time the Senate gave its advice and consent.” (emphasis added)). This limitation
upon the interpretation of treaties arguably supports the courts that have found the MBTA
to only apply to hunting and like activities that were the focus in 1918. See supra notes
128–148 and accompanying text (discussing the Eighth and Ninth Circuits’ limitation upon
the MBTA’s applicability based in part on the scope of the treaties only reaching hunting
and poaching activities); supra notes 183–202 and accompanying text (outlining the current
district court trend away from allowing MBTA prosecutions for commercial activities).
However, even if the MBTA’s original intent only covered hunting, the implementing language undoubtedly covers any “take” of migratory birds. See Brunner, supra note 204, at
38–39 (“The plain language of the MBTA provides, however, that everyday commercial
and industrial operators subject themselves to prosecution.”); id. at 39 (“In effect, the legislative history suggests that the MBTA was designed to preserve migratory bird population
in lieu of hunting practices, not everything under the sun.”). Therefore, the disconnect in
interpretation requires legislative action to clarify the implementing statute one way or the
other. Id. at 40.
245. HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 30.
246. Contra McKinsey, supra note 105, at 91 (arguing congressional modification of the
MBTA would take less time than the regulatory rule making process). Given the recent
partisan divide in Congress, any immediate action is unlikely. See generally, e.g., The New
Congress: Historical Relationship Between Congress and the Presidency and Important Issues Facing the 113th Congress and the Obama Administration, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 21, 2013),
http://fpc.state.gov/206369.htm (“I’d like to talk about why we have deadlock. You know
fully well that we have deadlock in the United States over the budget, over gun control,
over a variety of issues facing the 113th Congress . . . .”).
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B. FWS Development of an Incidental Take Permit
If Congress declines to amend the MBTA, the FWS may be able to
implement an incidental take permit program on its own. Although the
regulatory process may take longer than congressional action, there is
authority for the FWS to implement a general incidental take permit.247
One industry group, the Interstate Natural Gas Association of
America (INGAA), issued a report arguing for the FWS to implement a
“permit-by-rule” incidental take program248 without waiting for explicit
congressional authorization.249 First, the INGAA study emphasizes that
the MBTA confers authority on the Secretary of the Interior, through
FWS, to “determine when, to what extent, if at all, and by what means, it
is compatible with the terms of the conventions to allow . . . taking . . . of
any [protected] bird . . . , and to adopt suitable regulations permitting
and governing the same.”250 Accordingly, the MBTA alone, without explicit congressional approval, allows FWS to regulate take of protected
birds.251 In fact, the FWS has already implemented narrow permits for
direct and incidental take,252 though none of the existing permits cover
industrial incidental take.253
As the INGAA study points out, the second consideration for a
viable, FWS-implemented incidental take permit program is compatibility with the MBTA’s underlying treaties.254 Under those treaties, the incidental take permit program would contribute to the conservation of
migratory birds and their habitat.255 Three of the four treaties256 allow
take for “other specific purposes” consistent with the conservation of mi-

247. See generally HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 46 (“Based on the analysis in this
report, nothing in the four migratory bird treaties, the MBTA, its regulations, Executive
Order 13186, the MOUs, or Service guidance should preclude development or implementation of an incidental take permit program for migratory birds, so long as the permit program is developed consistent with the four migratory bird treaties.”).
248. Snodgrass, supra note 109, at 10A-27 to -28; see generally HOLLAND & HART, supra
note 48 (containing the INGAA report); see generally INGAA, http://www.ingaa.org/ (last
visited May 16, 2013) (“Representing Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Companies”).
249. See generally HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 5–27 (outlining authority for a
FWS-developed incidental take permit program); see Snodgrass, supra note 109, at 10A-27.
250. 16 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2011); see HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 6 (quoting 16
U.S.C. § 704(a)).
251. HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 6.
252. 50 C.F.R. pt. 21 (2013); see HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 6–8 (outlining the
existing incidental take permits).
253. See HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 30.
254. Id. at 6; Snodgrass, supra note 109, at 10A-27.
255. See HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 28–29 (discussing the four treaties and their
general provisions that the take of migratory birds must be consistent with conservation
principles).
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gratory birds.257 But these treaties limit those other purposes to “scientific, educational, [and] propagative” purposes.258 The plain meaning of
“other specific purposes” presents a potentially unlimited set of circumstances allowing take,259 so long as the take comports with the treaties’
conservation principles. An incidental take permit program for industrial
activities hardly comports with science, education, or species propagation. Thus, a court could find industrial incidental take falls outside the
“other specific purposes” for which the FWS may allow take.
Despite the potential for litigation, the FWS could build an incidental take program modeled on Congress’s military exercises exception. In evaluating the narrower military training incidental take
program, the FWS found that the program was compatible with the treaties.260 The INGAA study argues the military training permit program
paves the way for a broader incidental take program.261 However, the
study qualifies this conclusion: “Whether the Service’s regulations implementing the program for incidental take by the Armed Forces are consis-

256. Notably, only the Mexico Treaty mentions the possibility of industrial take. Mexico
Treaty, supra note 65, at art. I. The Mexico Treaty contains no explicit limitation upon take
permits except for the establishment of take-free “refugee zones” and a prohibition on taking insectivorous birds. Id. at art. II. The Mexico Treaty allows the United States and Mexico to implement laws authorizing take of protected birds “rationally for purposes of sport,
food, commerce and industry.” Id. at art. I; see HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 12 (highlighting the lack of specific limitations in the Mexico Treaty).
257. 1995 Protocol, supra note 54, at *4 (“[T]he taking of migratory birds may be allowed
at any time of the year for scientific, educational, propagative, or other specific purposes consistent with the conservation principles of this Convention.”) (emphasis added); Russia Treaty,
supra note 79, at art. II(1)(a) (allowing take for “scientific, educational, propagative, or other
specific purposes not inconsistent with the principles of this Convention.”) (emphasis added);
Japan Treaty, supra note 71, at art. III(1)(a) (permitting take for “scientific, educational,
propagative or other specific purposes not inconsistent with the objectives of this Convention.”)
(emphasis added); see HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 9–13 (outlining the provisions of
the treaties).
258. 1995 Protocol, supra note 54, at *4; Russia Treaty, supra note 79, at art. II(1)(a); Japan
Treaty, supra note 71, at art. III(1)(a).
259. See generally Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers Ass’n, 499 U.S. 117,
129 (1991) (“By itself, the phrase ‘all other law’ indicates no limitation.”). See Medellin v.
Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 (2008) (“[T]he interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a
statute, begins with its text.”).
260. Migratory Bird Permits; Take of Migratory Birds by the Armed Forces, 72 Fed.
Reg. 8931-01, 8946 (Feb. 28, 2007) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 21) (“Thus, the authorization in this rule . . . provides for compliance with the requirements of the treaties.”); HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 26 (discussing the FWS’s interpretation of the treaties).
261. HOLLAND & HART, supra note 48, at 27 (“As demonstrated by the Service’s development and implementation of a permit program for take incidental to military readiness
activities, the Service believes it has general authority to develop permit programs for incidental take of migratory birds.”).
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tent with the Canada, Japan, Mexico, and Russia treaties was not tested in
court and can no longer be challenged, but the Service believes them to
be consistent.”262 If the FWS acts alone to undertake an incidental take
program, the agency exposes itself to a challenge that it acted outside its
congressionally granted authority, issued regulations inconsistent with
the conservation principles of the underlying treaties, and interpreted
the phrase “other specific purposes” too expansively. Therefore, although the FWS may be able to implement an incidental take program
without congressional authorization,263 the best option remains a congressional mandate for an incidental take program.
CONCLUSION
The MBTA arose out of the gun smoke of hunters and poachers
who annihilated abundant migratory bird species across the United
States.264 Despite Congress’s clear concern with hunting and poaching
when it enacted the MBTA, the statute contains no explicit limitation on
the type of conduct it covers.265 The seemingly expansive MBTA language, and FWS enforcement of it, has now ensnared industrial activities
originally outside the scope of the MBTA.266 The FWS’s expansion of liability under the MBTA to include incidental industrial take created a significant circuit split: one side applying strict liability to industrial
activities limited only by proximate cause,267 and the other refusing to
apply the MBTA to indirect and unintentional take outside the original
scope of hunting and poaching.268 The divergent approaches created an
atmosphere of confusion for the FWS, industry, and lower courts—confusion that requires congressional or FWS attention.
Without congressional intervention, the MBTA will continue to be
stuck with varying interpretations from court to court, preventing the
effective and uniform conservation of migratory birds. Congress can

262. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 703 (limiting judicial review of FWS regulations under the
MBTA to 120 days after publication)) (emphasis added).
263. Id. at 33.
264. See supra notes 14–35 and accompanying text (outlining the destruction of migratory birds caused by hunting and poaching at the turn of the twentieth century).
265. See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text (discussing the original aim of the
MBTA and how the language actually turned out).
266. See supra notes 99–109 and accompanying text (describing the difficulty courts
have had in interpreting the MBTA’s scope in regard to incidental take caused by industrial activities).
267. See supra notes 149–182 and accompanying text (outlining the strict liability approach to the MBTA).
268. See supra notes 127–148 and accompanying text (highlighting the narrow interpretation of MBTA take).
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eliminate the confusion by amending the MBTA. A congressional mandate authorizing an incidental take permit program would provide the
clarity that the FWS, industry, and courts require.

